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a b s t r a c t
As it is documented, households’ investment in their own education (human capital) is negatively related to the number 
of children individuals will have and requires some loans to be financed. We show that this contributes to explain 
episodes of bubbles associated to higher growth rates. This conclusion is obtained in an overlapping generations model 
where agents choose to invest in their own education and decide their number of children. A bubble is a liquid asset that 
can be used to finance either education or the cost of rearing children. The time cost of rearing children plays a key role in 
the analysis. If the time cost per child is sufficiently high, households have only a small number of children. Then, the bubble 
has a crowding-in effect because it is used to provide loans to finance investments in education. On the contrary, if the time 
cost per child is low enough, households have a large number of children. Then, the bubble is mainly used to finance the 
total cost of rearing children and has a crowding-out effect on investment. Therefore, the new mechanism we highlight shows 
that a bubble enhances growth if the economy is characterized by a high rearing time cost per child.
1. Introduction
Caballero et al. (2006) and Martin and Ventura (2012) show
that episodes of bubbles are associated with larger growth rates.
This empirical fact contradicts the results obtained in seminal
contributions, where the existence of a bubble has a crowding-
out effect on capital accumulation (see Tirole (1985) with exoge-
nous growth or Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) with endogenous
growth). Many recent papers have tried to conciliate the theory
with the empirics, by providing some relevant explanations on
the growth enhancing role of a bubble. Some of the underly-
ing mechanisms are based on the existence of heterogeneous
productive investments and bubble shocks (Martin and Ventura,
2012), the existence of financial constraints (Fahri and Tirole,
2012; Hirano and Yanagawa, 2017; Kocherlakota, 2009; Miao and
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Wang, 2018), the difference between liquid and illiquid assets
(Raurich and Seegmuller, 2015, 2017), the existence of a bubble
on a productive asset (Olivier, 2000), among others.
In this paper, we provide a new mechanism explaining that
bubbles are associated to episodes of higher growth. It is based on
the trade-off faced by households between investing in education
(human capital) and having children. The bubble is interpreted
as the liquid asset used either for loans or for saving and that
modifies this trade-off. Two pieces of evidence provide support
to our mechanism relating investment in education with bubbles.
First, there is a trade-off between investing in education and
having children. As it is highlighted by Martinez et al. (2012),1
women and men with a higher level of education have fewer
children. For instance, in US during the period 2006–2010, the
average number of children ever born or fathered for women
aged 22–44 years is 2.5 when the woman has no high school
diploma or equivalent, is 1.8 when she has a high school diploma
or equivalent, is 1.5 when she was in some college, and is only
1.1 when she has a Bachelor’s degree or a higher diploma. We
observe the same trend for men. Similar findings can be found in
Jones and Tertilt (2008) or Preston and Hartnett (2011). This ev-
idence clearly indicates that there exists a negative link between
investment in education done at the beginning of the active life
and the number of children the household will have later.
1 See especially their Fig. 1.
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Second, any investment in education at the beginning of the
active life requires some loans to finance it. This may be illus-
trated by the case of student loans in the US. These loans have
drastically increased since the beginning of 2000s, to become
larger than $1 trillion in 2013 (Avery and Turner, 2012; Dynarski,
2014). This amount is far from being negligible in comparison to
other types of consumer loans, like auto loan or credit card.2
The previous evidence suggests that loans may facilitate in-
vestment in education, modify fertility and, finally, affect the
economic growth rate. In this paper, we consider that the support
of the loan is a liquid asset without fundamental value, i.e. it is a
bubble when it is positively valued. As mentioned, this asset can
be used to finance investment in education, like fees for instance,
which will enhance growth. However, it can also be a mean to
save and transfer purchasing power to finance rearing costs of
having children and consumption at the retired age. In this case,
the introduction of this asset may increase population and reduce
economic growth.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the bubble
on growth, through its effects on human capital and fertility.
To this end, we develop an overlapping generations model with
three-period lived agents. A household invests in education when
young and chooses the number of children when adult, facing a
time cost of rearing children. She is working when young and
adult, while she is engaged in home production when old. In
addition, each household trades the liquid asset when young and
adult to take out loans or transfer purchasing power to finance
some expenses, like the rearing costs. Finally, firms produce the
final good using human capital and a linear technology that
makes sustained growth possible.
Our main concern is to investigate when the existence of a
bubble promotes growth. In such a case, we say that the bubble
is productive. We show that this happens when the time cost of
rearing a child is high enough. Indeed, when the time cost per
child is low, the number of children is large and the total cost
of rearing children is also high. As a consequence, the bubble is
used to transfer wealth from young to middle-age, implying less
investment in education. The bubble has a crowding-out effect
on human capital and it reduces growth. On the contrary, when
the time cost of rearing a child is high, the number of children
is small and the total cost of rearing children is also small. As a
consequence, the bubble is used to transfer resources from adult
to young households. In this case, young agents take out some
loans being short-sellers of the bubble, to increase their invest-
ment in education. The bubble has a crowding-in effect on human
capital, which means that it is productive. Finally, we show that
the bubble can be productive even if the young households are
not short-sellers of the bubble. This situation happens when the
time cost of rearing a child takes intermediate values.
Our model also allows us to contribute to the debate on the
link between population size and the asset price (Abel, 2001;
Geanakoplos et al., 2004; Poterba, 2005). The main effect of pop-
ulation on asset valuation discussed in this literature is based on
the number of savers with respect to dissavers. A relative larger
number of savers raises the demand of asset and, therefore, its
price. We associate the asset price to the bubble on the liquid
asset and a larger ratio of adult over young households means
that the number of buyers of this asset is larger. We observe the
same link found by Geanakoplos et al. (2004) between the asset
price and the demography, i.e. a positive relationship between the
value of the asset and the ratio of adult over young households.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the model. In Section 3, we analyze the economy without
2 Since 2007, annual borrowing from US students is larger than $100 billions
(see Col (2016), Figure 5).
bubble. In Section 4, we characterize an equilibrium with a bub-
ble. In Section 5, we show the existence of an asymptotic bubbly
balanced growth path (BGP). We analyze whether a bubble may
be productive in Section 6. In Section 7, we interpret our results
according to the crowding-out versus crowding-in effects. Con-
cluding remarks are provided in Section 8, while some technical
details are relegated to an Appendix.
2. Model
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞) and there are two types
of agents, households and firms.
2.1. Firms
Aggregate output is produced by a continuum of firms, of unit
size, using labor, Lt , and human capital, Ht , as inputs. In addition,
production benefits from an externality that summarizes a learn-
ing by doing process and allows to have sustained growth. Fol-
lowing Frankel (1962) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), chapter
14), this externality depends on the average human capital–labor
ratio.
Letting ht ≡ Ht/Lt , ht represents the average ratio of hu-
man capital over labor. Firms produce the final good using the
following technology:
Yt = F (Ht , h̄tLt )
The technology F (Ht , h̄tLt ) has the usual neoclassical properties,
i.e. is a strictly increasing and concave production function sat-
isfying the Inada conditions, and is homogeneous of degree one
with respect to its two arguments.
Profit maximization under perfect competition implies that
the wage wt and the return of human capital qt are given by3
wt = F2(Ht , h̄tLt )h̄t (1)
qt = F1(Ht , h̄tLt ) (2)
Note that while wt is the basic wage, i.e. the return from one
additional unit of labor, qt is the return from an additional unit
of human capital and, hence, it measures the skill premium.
2.2. Households
We consider an overlapping generations economy populated
by agents living for three periods. An agent is young in the
first period of life, adult in the second period and old in the
third period. As it is argued by Geanakoplos et al. (2004), such
a demographic structure is a reasonable representation of the
households’ life-cycle.
Each household obtains utility from consumption at each pe-
riod of time and from the number of children when she is an
adult. Preferences of an individual born in period t are repre-
sented by the following utility function:
ln c1,t + β ln c2,t+1 + β2 ln(c3,t+2 + ϵ) + µ ln nt+1 (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, µ ∈ (0, 1)
measures the love for children and nt+1 is the number of children
an adult has.4 At each age, the household can consume the market
good produced by firms. Hence, cj,t amounts for consumption of
3 We denote by Fi(., .) the derivative with respect to the ith argument of
the function.
4 The assumption β ∈ (0, 1) is not required for our results, but is quite
natural when one interprets β as a discount factor. The assumption µ ∈ (0, 1)
means that love for children is less significant than the weight for consumption
at the first period of life. It simplifies some proofs. Otherwise, some additional
bounds on µ should be introduced.
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this good when young (j = 1), adult (j = 2) and old (j = 3).
We also assume that when old, the household has a consumption
of a home-produced good ϵ > 0 which is, to simplify, a perfect
substitute of the market good.5 As explained by Aguiar and Hurst
(2005), Hurst (2008) and Schwerdt (2005), home production at
the retirement age is quite a realistic feature since it seems to
solve the consumption puzzle when households are retired.6 As
in Kongsamut et al. (2001), we assume that the level of home
produced good ϵ > 0 is constant. An implication of this assump-
tion is that the ratio between home production and GDP declines.
This result is consistent with empirical findings that establish that
the productivity growth of home production is lower than the
productivity growth of market production and home production
over GDP or home production over market consumption strongly
decreases in the US between 1970 and 2005 (Duernecker and
Herrendorf, 2015; McDaniel, 2011). Note also that this assump-
tion implies that home production is independent of individual
skills, which is consistent with empirical findings (see Duernecker
and Herrendorf (2015)).
While each household uses her time endowment for home
production when old, she supplies labor to firms when young and
adult. When young, this labor supply is one unit. In contrast, labor
supply is endogenous when adult, as it depends on the number of
children. We denote by 0 < ψ < 1 the fraction of time an adult
spends for each child and, hence, the labor supply when adult is
1 − ψnt+1. This specification is often used in the literature on
fertility (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Galor, 2005).
When young, the household invests an amount et+1 in educa-
tion. This investment accounts for any cost of education, such as
fees. Each unit invested in education will increase human capital
at the next period. Therefore, it provides some additional returns
qt+1et+1 at the period where the agent is working for the market
good sector, i.e. when she is adult, but no return when she is
retired, i.e. when old. While the basic wage is the only income
when young, the income in the middle age also depends on the
return of education.7
We introduce loans by assuming that households may also
invest in a liquid asset without fundamental value when young
(b1,t ) and adult (b2,t+1 ). bi,t represents the value of the share of
this asset bought (bi,t > 0) or sold (bi,t < 0) by a young or an
adult household. There is a bubble on loans if this asset has a
strictly positive price. Since this asset is supplied in one unit, the
price B̂t is given by the sum of the values of the shares held by
households living at the same time, B̂t = Ntb1,t +Nt−1b2,t . When
B̂t = 0 and b1,t = b2,t = 0, the price of the asset is zero and there
is no bubble.
Accordingly, the budget constraints when young, middle age
and old faced by a household born in period t are, respectively,
c1,t + et+1 + b1,t = wt (4)
c2,t+1 + b2,t+1 = qt+1et+1 + Rt+1b1,t + wt+1(1 − ψnt+1) (5)
c3,t+2 = Rt+2b2,t+1 (6)
where 0 < nt+1 < 1/ψ . Population size of the generation born at
period t is Nt . Therefore, the evolution of the population size of
the successive generations is given by Nt+1 = nt+1Nt .
At this point, it is important to clarify that a bubble is a
financial instrument that facilities consumption smoothing even
5 For home-produced good, the reader can refer to Gronau (1986) for a
survey and Benhabib et al. (1991) for a macro-model with home production.
6 This puzzle is based on the observation that consumption expenditures are
lower when individuals are retired, but the amount of consumption of goods is
not lower.
7 Note that education and human capital have been introduced in a quite
similar way in several papers. See for instance de la Croix and Michel (2007) or
Gente et al. (2015).
more than a traditional loan. In the following sections, we ana-
lyze how this financial development affects the investment and
fertility decisions of individuals. However, we already note that
without home-produced good, i.e. ϵ = 0, we could not define
an equilibrium without bubble because the budget constraint (6)
would imply c3,t+2 = 0, which is not compatible with the utility
function (3) with ϵ = 0.
2.3. Equilibrium
At a symmetric equilibrium, ht = ht . Let us define α ≡
F1(1, 1)/F (1, 1) ∈ (0, 1) the capital share in total production and
A ≡ F (1, 1) > 0. Using (1) and (2), we deduce that
wt = (1 − α)Aht (7)
qt = αA (8)
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that
Lt = Nt + Nt−1(1 − ψnt ) = Nt (1 − ψ) + Nt−1 (9)
Investment in education done by young households directly
becomes human capital in the next period: Ht+1 = Ntet+1.8 Using
(9), we get
et+1 = ρ(nt+1)ht+1 (10)
with
ρ(nt+1) ≡ 1 + (1 − ψ)nt+1 (11)
3. The economy without bubble
We first analyze the economy without bubble, i.e. b1,t = b2,t =
0. It corresponds to our benchmark case and it will allow us to
compare the properties of equilibria with and without bubble.
3.1. Household’s choices
Maximizing utility (3) under the budget constraints (4)–(6)
with b1,t = b2,t+1 = 0, we obtain the level of productive
investment and the number of children:
et+1 =
1
1 + µ+ β
[
(µ+ β)wt −
wt+1
qt+1
]
(12)
nt+1 =
µ
1 + µ+ β
wt + wt+1/qt+1
ψwt+1/qt+1
(13)
Investment in education is used by the households to smooth
consumption between young and adult ages. Hence, the return
from investment in education, qt+1, provides the measure of the
discount rate in this economy without bubbles. This explains that,
on the one hand, investment in education increases with the
wage earned when young and decreases with the present value
of the wage received when adult. On the other hand, the number
of children increases with the lifetime income, wt + wt+1/qt+1,
but decreases with the discounted value of the rearing cost of
having children ψwt+1/qt+1. As a result, the number of chil-
dren decreases following an increase of the wage growth factor
wt+1/wt .
8 Since human capital fully depreciates in one period, Ht+1 does not depend
on Ht .
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3.2. Bubbleless BGP
Let us denote by γt+1 ≡ ht+1/ht the growth factor of human
capital per unit of labor. Using (7), (8) and (13), we have
nt+1 =
µ
ψ(1 + µ+ β)
(
1 +
αA
γt+1
)
(14)
Since the wage increases with human capital per unit of labor
and the number of children decreases with the wage growth
factor, population growth reduces with the growth factor γt+1.
As it is illustrated by Galor (2005), this negative relationship is in
accordance with what we observe in Western Europe and in US,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada since one century.
Using (7), (8) and (12), we get
et+1 =
1
1 + µ+ β
[
(µ+ β)(1 − α)Aht −
1 − α
α
ht+1
]
(15)
Substituting (10), (11) and (14) in (15), we obtain
γt+1 = αA
ψ[µ+ β(1 − α)] − αµ
ψ(1 + αβ) + αµ
≡ γwb (16)
where γwb > 0 if and only if ψ > αµ/[µ+ β(1 − α)] ≡ ψ0wb.
Substituting (16) in (14), we finally obtain the population
growth factor:
nwb =
µ
ψ[µ+ β(1 − α)] − αµ
(17)
Note that nwb < 1/ψ if and only if ψ > ψnwb, which is larger
than ψ0wb and smaller than 1 if µ < µnwb, with
ψnwb ≡
αµ
β(1 − α)
and µnwb ≡
β(1 − α)
α
(18)
We deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume that 1 > ψ > ψnwb and µ < µnwb
hold. Then, it follows that nwb < 1/ψ is satisfied and there exists
an equilibrium along which b1,t = b2,t = 0, γt+1 = γwb and
nt+1 = nwb hold for all t.
Without bubble, there is no transitional dynamics. We also
note that there is sustained growth, γwb > 1, if the productivity
A is high enough.
4. Equilibrium with a bubble
When there is a bubble (b1,t ̸= 0 and/or b2,t ̸= 0), a household
maximizes her utility (3) under the budget constraints (4)–(6)
taking into account that she can smooth consumption between
the three periods of life using the liquid asset and between young
and adult using investment in education. As a consequence, by
arbitrage, we get Rt+1 = qt+1. Then, the number of children and
the consumptions over the life-cycle are given by
nt+1 =
µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
+
ϵ
Rt+1Rt+2
ψ
wt+1
Rt+1
(19)
c1t =
1
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
+
ϵ
Rt+1Rt+2
)
(20)
c2t+1 =
βRt+1
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
+
ϵ
Rt+1Rt+2
)
(21)
c3t+2 =
β2Rt+1Rt+2
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
)
−
1 + β + µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
ϵ
(22)
Since when old, the market good produced by the firms is
substitutable to a home-produced good, we should take care that
c3t+2 is non-negative. However, as we will see later, the growing
disposable incomewt+wt+1/Rt+1 ensures a positive consumption
c3t+2 > 0 at the long run equilibrium with sustained growth we
are interested in.
Using (4), (6), (10), (20) and (22), we deduce that
b1t =
β + β2 + µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
wt
−
1
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
wt+1
Rt+1
+
ϵ
Rt+1Rt+2
)
− ρ(nt+1)ht+1 (23)
b2t+1 =
β2Rt+1
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
wt +
wt+1
Rt+1
)
−
ϵ
Rt+2
1 + β + µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
(24)
Because of the budget constraint (4), we observe that the
share of the bubble bought by a young household decreases
with investment in education and consumption at the first pe-
riod of life. The first relation explains the negative effect of
ρ(nt+1)ht+1 on bubble holding when young (see (23)), while the
second one implies that b1t decreases with the future wage,
because consumption when young linearly rises with the life-
cycle wage income (see Eq. (20)). By inspection of Eq. (24), we
deduce that since the share of the bubble held in middle-age is
the saving when adult, it increases with the disposable income
wt +wt+1/Rt+1. Because the wage linearly increases with human
capital over labor, it explains that b2t+1 will increase with ht+1,
but at a lower rate. Finally, using Eq. (19), the number of children
rises with the life-cycle wage income, but decreases with the dis-
counted value of the rearing cost ψwt+1/Rt+1. Therefore, a higher
wage when adult negatively affects the number of children.
These relations will allow us to deduce that b1t/ht , b2t/ht
and nt+1 are decreasing with the growth factor γt+1. As we
explained in the economy without bubble, the negative relation-
ship between the number of children and the growth factor is
observed in many developed countries since the beginning of
the last century (Galor, 2005). To properly derive these negative
relationships, let us note λt ≡ ϵ/ht . Then, using (7), (8), (23) and
(24) we determine the shares of the bubble held by the young and
adult households detrended by human capital per unit of labor:
b1t
ht
= (1 − α)A
β + β2 + µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
(25)
− γt+1
[
ρ(γt+1, λt+1) +
1
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
1−α
α
+
λt+1
(αA)2
)]
≡ b̃1(γt+1, λt+1)
b2t
ht
=
β2(1 − α)A
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
αA
γt
+ 1
)
−
λt
αA
1 + β + µ
1 + β + β2 + µ
≡ b̃2(γt , λt ) (26)
with ρ(γt+1, λt+1) ≡ ρ(n(γt+1, λt+1)) and, using (19), we obtain
n(γt+1, λt+1) ≡
µ/ψ
1 + β + β2 + µ
(
αA
γt+1
+ 1 +
λt+1
α(1 − α)A2
)
= nt+1 (27)
Equilibrium in the asset market means that
Nt+1b1t+1 + Ntb2t+1 = Rt+1(Ntb1t + Nt−1b2t ) (28)
where we recall that the value of the bubble at time t is given by
B̂t = Ntb1t +Nt−1b2t . Let Bt ≡ B̂t/(htNt−1). Using Rt+1 = qt+1, (8),
(25)–(27), the evolution of the population size and the definition
of λt , an intertemporal equilibrium is defined by
Bt = n(γt , λt )̃b1(γt+1, λt+1) + b̃2(γt , λt ) (29)
Bt+1 =
αA
n(γt , λt )γt+1
Bt (30)
4
λt+1 =
1
γt+1
λt (31)
This system drives the dynamics of (γt , Bt , λt ) ∈ R3++ for
all t and allows us to study the long run equilibrium. To study
the transitional dynamics, it is important to note that Bt , which
represents the price of the liquid asset detrended by the ratio
of human capital per unit of labor times the population size,
is determined by expectations about the future and there is a
bubble if and only if Bt > 0. Therefore, this variable is not
predetermined. The growth factor γt is also a non-predetermined
variable, because it is a function of human capital per unit of
labor ht (= γtht−1) = Ht/Lt and Lt = Nt (1 − ψ) + Nt−1 is
not predetermined as it depends on the endogenous number
of children nt = Nt/Nt−1 chosen at period t . On the contrary,
because ht implies that γt is not predetermined, λt = ϵ/ht is
predetermined.
5. Asymptotic bubbly BGP
We focus on equilibria with a bubble growing at the same rate
than human capital, i.e. with a positive and constant value of B,
and sustained growth. This means that we are concerned with
equilibria such that γt > 1, which implies that ht will tend to +∞
in the long run. Along such a dynamic path, λt = ϵ/ht decreases
and tends to 0 when time tends to +∞. The dynamic system
(29)–(31) admits no steady state, but may converge asymptot-
ically to a long run equilibrium with γ ∗ > 1 and λ∗ = 0.
This equilibrium will correspond to an asymptotic BGP with a
positive bubble and sustained growth. Using Eqs. (29)–(31), it is
a stationary solution (γ ∗, B∗, λ∗) satisfying γ ∗ > 1, λ∗ = 0 and
γ ∗n(γ ∗, 0) = αA (32)
B∗ = n(γ ∗, 0)̃b1(γ ∗, 0) + b̃2(γ ∗, 0) > 0 (33)
Using Eqs. (27) and (32), the growth factor γ ∗ is given by
γ ∗ = αA
ψ(1 + β + β2 + µ) − µ
µ
(34)
The inequality ψ > µ/(1 + β + β2 + µ) ensures that γ ∗ > 0.
Then, there is sustained growth (γ ∗ > 1) if and only if
A >
µ
α[ψ(1 + β + β2 + µ) − µ]
≡ A1 (35)
Using (25), (26), (32) and (34), the population growth factor is
given by
n(γ ∗, 0) =
αA
γ ∗
=
µ
ψ(1 + β + β2 + µ) − µ
≡ n∗ (36)
and the shares of the bubble bought when young and adult by
b̃1(γ ∗, 0) = (1 − α)A −
ψ
µ
A
[
1 + α(β + β2)
]
≡ b̃∗1 (37)
b̃2(γ ∗, 0) =
ψβ2(1 − α)A
ψ(1 + β + β2 + µ) − µ
≡ b̃∗2 (38)
We deduce that the detrended value of the bubble is
B∗ = n∗̃b∗1 + b̃
∗
2 =
A
[
1 + αβ + (2α − 1)β2
]
ψ(1 + β + β2 + µ) − µ
(ψb − ψ) (39)
with
ψb ≡ µ
1 − α
1 + αβ + (2α − 1)β2
(40)
In the following proposition, we summarize the existence
of the asymptotic bubbly BGP and analyze also its stability. To
that extent, note that from a mathematical point of view, the
asymptotic steady state is a steady state of the dynamic system
(29)–(31). Therefore, we study its stability using a usual lineariza-
tion, which allows us to deduce the stability properties in the
neighborhood of the asymptotic BGP. Accordingly, we follow the
method used in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), Alonso-Carrera
and Raurich (2015, 2018) or Steger (2000), among others.
Proposition 2. Let
ψ ≡
µ
1 + β + β2
(41)
Assume that α < β+2β
2
1+2β+3β2
, A > A1 and ψ < ψ < min{ψb; 1} hold.
There is a unique asymptotic BGP with sustained growth (γ ∗ > 1,
n∗ < 1/ψ) and a positive bubble (B∗ > 0). In addition, the
equilibrium converges to this BGP.
Proof. See Appendix A. ■
This proposition establishes the existence of a unique asymp-
totic BGP with a positive bubble and sustained growth. The
economy converges to this asymptotic BGP, which is locally
indeterminate. In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that there
are two stable eigenvalues. Since one of these eigenvalues equals
zero, in period one, there is a jump into a one-dimensional
stable submanifold. The equilibrium exhibits local indeterminacy,
because there is a unique state variable and the stable manifold
is two-dimensional at t = 0.9
Sustained growth requires both a sufficiently high productivity
A and a high enough ψ (see Eq. (34)). Indeed, a high time cost
per child ψ reduces the incentive to have children. This implies
that only a small amount of adult time is devoted to the total
time cost of rearing children ψn∗ (see Eq. (36)) and a large part
of household resources can be used to invest in education, which
promotes human capital and growth.
As we have seen previously, the shares of the bubble held
by both young and middle-age households, and the number of
children decrease with the growth factor. This implies that a
positive bubble requires a not too significant level of growth. As
a result, the cost ψ should not be too high. This explains the
constraints on the value of ψ in Proposition 2.
We now investigate more deeply the properties of this asymp-
totic bubbly BGP. We start by focusing on whether young and
middle-age households are buyers (̃b∗i > 0) or rather short-sellers
(̃b∗i < 0) of the liquid asset. In this last case, this asset allows to
borrow through loans. By direct inspection of Eq. (38), there is no
doubt that b̃∗2 > 0 at the bubbly BGP. Adult households use the
bubble to transfer purchasing power to their last period of life. In
contrast, whether young agents are buyers or short-sellers of the
bubble needs a deeper analysis (see Eq. (37)).
Corollary 1. Let
ψ̂ ≡
(1 − α)µ
1 + α(β + β2)
(42)
1. Assume that A > A1 and
β+β2
1+2β+2β2
⩽ α < β+2β
2
1+2β+3β2
hold.
At the asymptotic bubbly BGP, young agents are short-sellers
(̃b∗1 < 0) for all ψ < ψ < min{ψb; 1};
2. Assume that A > A1 and α <
β+β2
1+2β+2β2
hold. At the
asymptotic bubbly BGP, young agents are short-sellers (̃b∗1 <
0) for ψ̂ < ψ < min{ψb; 1}, neither buy nor sell the bubble
(̃b∗1 = 0) for ψ = ψ̂ , and buy the bubble (̃b
∗
1 > 0) for
ψ < ψ < ψ̂ .
9 Technical details are given in Appendix A.
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Fig. 1. Growth with versus without bubble.
Proof. See Appendix B. ■
A direct implication of this result is that an asymptotic bubbly
BGP may exist if either the young households buy the bubble
(̃b∗1 > 0) or take out some loans by being short-sellers of this
asset to finance their investment in education (̃b∗1 < 0).
Corollary 1 shows that young households are short-sellers of
the bubble if either the return of human capital αA or the time
cost per child ψ is sufficiently high. In the first case, the high
return of human capital creates an incentive to finance education
by selling short the liquid asset. In the second case, the quite high
time cost per child incites households to have only a few number
of children. Therefore, with the log-linear utility, the total rearing
cost, ψn∗, is relatively low (see Eq. (36)). This low total time
cost of rearing children incites the households to engage in loans
when young to foster investments in education and redistributes
income from the middle to the young age. On the contrary, in
the second configuration of the corollary, i.e. ψ is low, the total
time cost ψn∗ is relatively high. Then, young households buy the
bubble to finance this rearing cost of having children when adult.
6. Is a bubble productive?
We analyze now whether a bubble is productive. We say that
it is productive when the growth factor at the asymptotic bubbly
BGP is higher than at the bubbleless one. In this case, the positive
valuation of the bubble raises the growth rate.
For such an analysis, the conditions for the existence of a
bubbleless BGP, i.e. 1 > ψ > ψnwb and µ < µnwb, and those
for the existence of an asymptotic bubbly BGP, i.e. α < β+2β
2
1+2β+3β2
,
A > A1 and ψ < ψ < min{ψb; 1}, should all be satisfied
and should not imply an empty admissible interval for some
parameters. Then, we could compare the asymptotic bubbly and
bubbleless BGPs. We show the following:
Proposition 3. Let
ψp ≡
µ[(1 − α)(1 + µ+ β) − αβ2]
(1 + αβ)(1 + β + β2 + µ)
(43)
1. Assume that A > A1, µ < µnwb, α ⩽
β
1+2β+β2
and
max{ψ;ψnwb} < ψ ⩽ ψp hold. Then, the growth factor at
the asymptotic bubbly BGP is lower than at the bubbleless BGP
(γ ∗ ⩽ γwb);
2. Assume that A > A1, µ < µnwb, α ⩽
β
1+2β+β2
and ψp < ψ <
min{ψb; 1} hold. Then, the growth factor at the asymptotic
bubbly BGP is strictly larger than at the bubbleless BGP (γ ∗ >
γwb).
Proof. See Appendix C. ■
As it is illustrated in Fig. 1, Proposition 3 shows that when
the time cost per child ψ is relatively low, the economy without
bubble is characterized by a higher growth rate than the economy
with a bubble. On the contrary, when the time cost per child ψ
is relatively high, the economy with bubble is characterized by
a higher growth rate than the economy without bubble. In other
words, if the time cost per child ψ is lower than the threshold ψp,
the bubble is damaging for growth. If it is larger, the bubble or the
positive valuation of the liquid asset is beneficial for growth. This
last result is in accordance with the empirical facts underlying
that episodes of bubble are associated with higher growth rates,
as it is well documented in Caballero et al. (2006) or Martin and
Ventura (2012).
While seminal papers like Tirole (1985) show that bubbles im-
ply lower capital accumulation, various more recent contributions
provide some mechanisms to reconcile the existence of rational
bubbles with larger levels of capital (Fahri and Tirole, 2012;
Kocherlakota, 2009; Martin and Ventura, 2012; Miao and Wang,
2018; Raurich and Seegmuller, 2015). In models with endogenous
growth, Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) show that the existence
of a bubble reduces the growth rate, but more recent results show
that bubbles may be in accordance with higher growth rates.
Olivier (2000) highlights that a bubble on equity raises the value
of firms, which promotes firm creation and growth. On the con-
trary, bubbles on unproductive assets have the same effect than
in Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). Hirano and Yanagawa (2017)
discuss the existence of bubbles in a model with heterogeneous
investment projects and borrowing constraints. These authors
are especially concerned with the interplay between growth and
the existence of bubbles according to the degree of financial
imperfections.
Our paper differs from these last two contributions. In con-
trast to Olivier (2000), growth is enhanced by the existence of a
bubble even if the bubble is on an unproductive asset. Therefore,
the mechanism that allows to have a productive bubble in our
framework is different. We also depart from Hirano and Yana-
gawa (2017) since we do not consider heterogeneous investment
projects and do not discuss the results according to the level of
financial frictions.
By inspection of Corollary 1 and Proposition 3, the bubble
pushes up growth if ψ > max{ψp, ψ̂}. In this configuration,
households are short-sellers of the bubble to have loans from
middle-age agents used to finance investments in education.
Hence, the bubble promotes human capital and, therefore, growth.
It is however interesting to note that we can have ψp lower
than ψ̂ .10 This means that for ψp < ψ < ψ̂ , we can have a higher
growth of the ratio of human capital over labor at the asymptotic
bubbly BGP than at the bubbleless one (γ ∗ > γwb) even if young
households are not short-sellers of the speculative asset. This
is in contrast with Raurich and Seegmuller (2015, 2017) who
study the existence of rational bubbles in overlapping generations
economies with three period-lived households, vintage capital
and exogenous growth. In both papers, capital is higher at the
bubbly than at the bubbleless steady state only if either young
or adult households are short-sellers of the bubble. Here, we
obtain a different result, which means that the mechanism for
the existence of a productive bubble is different than in these two
papers.
Our model with endogenous fertility and rational bubble also
allows us to refer to the debate on the link between population
size and the value of assets (Abel, 2001; Geanakoplos et al., 2004;
10 We note that when Proposition 3 applies, it corresponds to case 2 of
Corollary 1, because β
1+2β+β2
<
β+β2
1+2β+2β2
. Then, using (42) and (43), ψp < ψ̂
requires µ < 1−α(1−α)+α
2(β+β2)
α(1−α) .
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Poterba, 2005), which explains that asset price is higher when
the relative number of savers is larger. In particular, Geanakoplos
et al. (2004) consider an overlapping generations model with
three-period lived agents and show this relationship in a model
where the relative number of savers is directly related to the ratio
of middle-age over young households.
Of course, to make a link between population size and asset
price level, one needs to focus on the comparison of quite long
periods. Therefore, we can contribute to this debate comparing
the asymptotic bubbly and bubbleless BGPs and focusing on the
price of the liquid asset. Obviously, the price of this asset is
larger with the bubble than without. In the next corollary, we
consider the range of parameter values for which the bubble is
productive and we first make sure that, at the asymptotic bubbly
BGP, middle-age households hold a larger amount of the bubble
than young ones. Then, observing that the ratio of middle-age
over young households is given by MYt ≡ Nt−1/Nt = 1/nt , we
denote by MY ∗ and MYwb the value of this ratio evaluated at
the asymptotic bubbly and bubbleless BGPs, respectively, and we
compare them:
Corollary 2. Assume that A > A1, µ < µnwb, ψp < ψ <
min{ψb; 1} and α ⩽
β
1+2β+β2
hold. Then, we have b̃∗2 > n
∗̃b∗1,
γ ∗ > γwb and n∗ < nwb, which means that MY ∗ > MYwb.
Proof. See Appendix D. ■
This corollary ensures first that middle-age households hold
a larger amount of the bubble than young agents living at the
same period (̃b∗2 > n
∗̃b∗1). Therefore, a higher MY is a relevant
measure to argue that more traders buy the speculative asset.
Then, comparing the asymptotic bubbly and bubbleless BGPs, we
have not only that γ ∗ > γwb, but also MY ∗ > MYwb and the
price of the speculative asset is of course larger at the asymptotic
bubbly BGP, since it is zero at the bubbleless one. This cor-
roborates the theoretical and empirical findings of Geanakoplos
et al. (2004) on the link between demography and asset prices.
The basic mechanism they focus on is the following: the lower
price of asset is explained by a relative lower number of savers,
measured by a smaller ratio of adult over young households,
which reduces the demand of asset. In our model, we associate
the asset price to the bubble and a larger ratio of adult over young
households means that the main buyers of the speculative asset
are relatively more. Hence, we observe in the long run the same
link than Geanakoplos et al. (2004) between the asset price and
the demography.
7. Crowding-out versus crowding-in effect
To explain the economic mechanism that allows to have larger
growth when there is a bubble, we next highlight three main
ingredients that relate the explanation to the value of the time
cost per child ψ .
1. The liquid asset allows to smooth consumption along the
life-cycle. At middle-age, a household buys the bubble
(̃b∗2 > 0) to transfer purchasing power to the old age.
Using b̃∗1, the household uses the liquid asset to take out
some loans or save for adulthood. As already discussed
in the previous section, we learn from Corollary 1 and
Proposition 3 that a growth enhancing bubble at the BGP
is not equivalent to have b̃∗1 < 0, i.e. young households are
short-sellers of the bubble to get some loans. Indeed, there
is a value ψ̂ such that b̃∗1 > 0 if ψ < ψ̂ , b̃
∗
1 = 0 if ψ = ψ̂ ,
while b̃∗1 < 0 if ψ > ψ̂ .
2. In Corollary 2, we have shown that if γ ∗ > γwb, we get
n∗ < nwb. Now, without comparing the growth factors, we
deduce, using (17) and (36), that n∗ < nwb if and only if
ψ > ψn, with
ψn ≡
µ(1 − α)
1 + β(α + β)
(44)
3. Recall now that γ denotes the growth factor of human
capital per unit of labor. It is often more usual to define
the growth factor of human capital per capita (or GDP per
capita). This last one is defined by Ht/Nt = htLt/Nt =
ht (1−ψ + 1/nt ). On a BGP, since n is constant, the growth
factor of human capital per capita is also equal to γ and
the growth factor of human capital is defined by
γH ≡
Ht+1
Ht
=
ht+1
ht
Nt+1
Nt
= γ n
Using (32), γH = αA ≡ γ ∗H at the asymptotic bubbly BGP
and, using (16) and (17), γH = µαAψ(1+αβ)+αµ ≡ γH,wb at the
bubbleless BGP. We deduce that γ ∗H > γH,wb if and only if
ψ > ψH , with
ψH ≡
µ(1 − α)
1 + αβ
(45)
Using (42), (44) and (45), we have that ψn < ψ̂ < ψH .11 This
allows us to draw Fig. 2, which is useful to understand why the
bubble can increase growth of GDP per capita. As follows from
this figure, there are three main configurations according to the
value of ψ: ψ < ψn, ψn < ψ < ψH and ψ > ψH .
Before studying these different configurations, it is useful to
note that since γ = γH/n, the threshold value ψp above which
γ ∗ > γwb belongs to (ψn, ψH ). Of course, γ ∗ > γwb for ψ ⩾ ψH
and γ ∗ < γwb for ψ ⩽ ψn.
1. ψ < ψn: Crowding-out effect
Since ψ is small, the number of children and the total
time cost of rearing children ψn are high, whether or not
the bubble exists (see (17) and (36)). Therefore, when the
liquid asset is positively valued, the households use it to
transfer income to middle-age and cover rearing expenses.
This reduces investment in education, which implies less
human capital and a lower growth. This also reduces the
cost of having children ψwt+1 in terms of consumption,
which explains that population growth is higher at the
asymptotic bubbly BGP than at the bubbleless one.
2. ψn < ψ < ψH : Indeterminate crowding effect
Both ψ and ψn∗ take intermediate values. The main mech-
anism at stake is clearly different than in the previous
configuration. To understand what happens, let us assume
ψ = ψ̂ . At the asymptotic bubbly BGP, young households
11 One can further note that under Proposition 3, max{ψ;ψnwb} < ψn and
ψH < min{ψb; 1}, which means that the critical values we focus on belong to
the interval of ψ considered in Proposition 3.
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neither buy, nor sell the bubble, i.e. b̃∗1 = 0. Since b̃
∗
2 > 0, a
middle-age household saves to finance consumption when
old and reduces the child related expenses by having a
lower number of children at the asymptotic bubbly BGP.
Then, investment in education e, whose returns are used to
finance future expenditures at adulthood, can be higher or
lower at the asymptotic bubbly BGP than at the bubbleless
one because of two opposite effects: on the one hand, fewer
child related expenses have to be covered; on the other
hand, the purchase of the bubble to finance consumption
when old has to be financed.
3. ψ > ψH : Crowding-in effect
Since ψ is large enough, the number of children and ψn
are relatively low, whether or not the bubble exists. There-
fore, the main mechanism is exactly the opposite one than
in the first configuration. In this case, the labor supply
when adult is high and the cost of rearing children to
be financed is low. When the bubble exists, there is a
transfer of resources from the adult to the young age. The
young household becomes a short-seller of the bubble, to
get loans and increase investments in education. Therefore,
this enhances human capital and growth at the asymptotic
bubbly BGP. This larger growth also implies a larger cost of
having children ψwt+1 in terms of consumption. Therefore,
population growth is lower when there is a bubble.
8. Concluding remarks
We develop a model where a liquid asset (bubble) is used to
finance two types of expenditures, education and costs of rearing
children. If the time cost per child ψ is low, the household has
a large number of children, meaning that the total time cost
ψn is high. In this case, the bubble is mainly used to finance
child related expenses during adulthood instead of investment
in education during youth. The bubble is a mean of saving and
growth is lower with a bubble than without. If ψ is high, we
have the opposite. The total time cost of having children ψn is
low and the bubble is a mean to get loans to finance education,
which enhances human capital and growth.
The comparison between equilibria with and without bubble
can also be interpreted in terms of financial development. Such
an interpretation of our results may contribute to the literature
studying the link between financial development and growth.12
In our framework, the bubbly equilibrium describes an economy
where financial markets are more developed since there is an
adding traded asset valued on such a market. Under this in-
terpretation, our model suggests that financial development is
beneficial for growth only under some circumstances, i.e. if ψ is
high enough.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
We have n∗ < 1/ψ if and only if ψ > ψ , where this inequality
ensures that ψ > µ/(1 + β + β2 + µ). Then, using (39), we
immediately see that B∗ > 0 if and only if ψ < ψb. We also
note that ψ < 1 because µ < 1 and ψ < ψb is equivalent
to α < β+2β
2
1+2β+3β2
. Of course, there is sustained growth because
A > A1.
Let us focus now on the stability properties. Even if (γ ∗, B∗, 0)
is an asymptotic BGP, it is important to note that from the
mathematical point of view, (γt , Bt , λt ) = (γ ∗, B∗, 0) is a steady
state of the dynamic system (29)–(31). Therefore, to analyze the
12 See Levine (2005) for a survey and Madsen and Ang (2016) for a recent
contribution.
stability properties of the equilibrium (γ ∗, B∗, 0), we use standard
mathematical tools.
Differentiating the dynamic system (29)–(31) in the neighbor-
hood of the BGP (γ ∗, B∗, 0), we obtain a linear system of the
following form:
dBt+1 = a11dBt + a12dγt + a13dλt
dγt+1 = a21dBt + a22dγt + a23dλt
dλt+1 = a33dλt
Therefore, the characteristic polynomial can be written P(η) ≡
(a33 − η)(η2 − Tη + D) = 0, with T = a11 + a22 and D =
a11a22 − a12a21. We immediately deduce that one eigenvalue is
given by η1 = a33 = 1/γ ∗ ∈ (0, 1). To determine the other
eigenvalues, we compute the terms aij, with {i, j} = {1, 2}:
a11 = 1 −
B∗
αA∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(A.1)
a12 = −
B∗
n∗
∂nt
∂γt
+
B∗
αA∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(̃
b∗1
∂nt
∂γt
+
∂ b̃∗2
∂γt
)
(A.2)
a21 =
γ ∗
αA∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(A.3)
a22 = −
γ ∗
αA∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(̃
b∗1
∂nt
∂γt
+
∂ b̃∗2
∂γt
)
(A.4)
The minor D is given by
D =
γ ∗
αA∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(
B∗
n∗
∂nt
∂γt
− b̃∗1
∂nt
∂γt
−
∂ b̃∗2
∂γt
)
Using n∗ = αA/γ ∗ and B∗ = n∗̃b∗1 + b̃
∗
2, we obtain
D =
1
(n∗)2∂ b̃∗1/∂γt+1
(̃
b∗2
∂nt
∂γt
−
∂ b̃∗2
∂γt
n∗
)
From (26) and (27), we get
∂nt
∂γt
= −
µ/ψ
1 + β + β2 + µ
αA
γ 2t
∂ b̃∗2
∂γt
= −
β2αA
1 + β + β2 + µ
(1 − α)A
γ 2t
Using (36) and (38), we deduce that D = 0. This means that
one eigenvalue is zero, i.e. η2 = 0. Using now (26), (27), (A.1) and
(A.4), T rewrites
T = 1 −
B∗
αA
(
αA
γ ∗
+ 1
)
∂ b̃∗1
∂γt+1
We easily derive from (25) that
∂ b̃∗1
∂γt+1
= −1 −
(1 − ψ)µ/ψ
1 + β + β2 + µ
−
1
1 + β + β2 + µ
1 − α
α
< 0
We deduce that the last eigenvalue is given by η3 = T > 1.
To better understand the dimension of the stable manifold
and the type of indeterminacy generated by the model, the stable
solution of the dynamic system is given by
Bt = v11ξ1ηt1 + v21ξ2η
t
2 + B
∗ (A.5)
γt = v12ξ1η
t
1 + v22ξ2η
t
2 + γ
∗ (A.6)
λt = v13ξ1η
t
1 + v23ξ2η
t
2 (A.7)
for all t ⩾ 1. The parameter ξi is a constant and vi = (vi1, vi2, vi3)
is the eigenvector associated to the eigenvalue ηi, for i = 1, 2. The
eigenvectors are defined by
(a11 − ηi)vi1 + a12vi2 + a13vi3 = 0 (A.8)
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a21vi1 + (a22 − ηi)vi2 + a23vi3 = 0 (A.9)
(a33 − ηi)vi3 = 0 (A.10)
For i = 1, we have η1 = a33 = 1/γ ∗. Eq. (A.10) is satisfied for
v13 ̸= 0. Given the value of v13, Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9) rewrite
(a11 − a33)v11 + a12v12 = −a13v13 (A.11)
a21v11 + (a22 − a33)v12 = −a23v13 (A.12)
There exists a unique solution (v11, v12) ̸= (0, 0) at this system
because (a11 − a33)(a22 − a33) − a12a21 = a233 − a33T + D =
a33(a33 − T ) < 0.
For i = 2, we have η2 = 0. Using (A.10), we get v23 = 0. Then,
using (A.8) and (A.9), we deduce that v21 = v22 = 0.
Using these results, Eqs. (A.5)–(A.7) become
Bt = v11ξ1ηt1 + B
∗, γt = v12ξ1η
t
1 + γ
∗, λt = v13ξ1η
t
1
or, equivalently
γt − γ
∗
=
v12
v13
λt , Bt − B∗ =
v11
v13
λt
for all t ⩾ 1.
This means that for all periods t ⩾ 1, the stable manifold is
one-dimensional. Moreover, the stable manifold is transversal to
the subspace spanned by the jump variables, as we have shown
that the eigenvector associated to the eigenvalue η1 = a33 is
different from zero.
However, because one eigenvalue is equal to 0, the stable
manifold is two-dimensional at t = 0, but the economy jumps
at t = 1 to the one dimensional stable submanifold described
above. There is a form of local indeterminacy because the stable
manifold has a dimension strictly higher than one at t = 0.
Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 1
Using (37), we see that b̃∗1 < 0 if and only if ψ > ψ̂ . We
further have that ψ̂ < ψb, ψ̂ < 1 is ensured by µ < 1 and
ψ̂ > ψ if and only if α < β+β
2
1+2β+2β2
. If this last inequality is
not satisfied, we have ψ̂ ⩽ ψ . Since β+β
2
1+2β+2β2
<
β+2β2
1+2β+3β2
, the
corollary immediately follows.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
We first take into account the conditions for the existence
of a bubbleless BGP, i.e. µ < µnwb and ψ > ψnwb. They are
compatible with the conditions for the existence of an asymptotic
bubbly BGP if ψnwb < ψb, which is satisfied if and only if
α(1 + 2β + β2) − β + 2αβ2(α − 1) < 0. This last inequality
is ensured for α ⩽ β
1+2β+β2
, which implies that α < β+2β
2
1+2β+3β2
.
Therefore, the bubbleless and asymptotic bubbly BGP coexist if
max{ψ;ψnwb} < ψ < min{ψb; 1}.
Using (16) and (34), we note that γ ∗ > γwb if and only if
ψ > ψp. We can further show that ψp < 1 and ψp < ψb because
α ⩽ β
1+2β+β2
. Moreover, using (18), (41) and (43), we can further
show that under α ⩽ β
1+2β+β2
, we have ψp > max{ψ;ψnwb}.
Indeed, ψp > ψ is equivalent to
(1+β+β2)[β−α(1+2β+β2)] > µ[α(1+2β+β2)− (β+β2)]
and ψp > ψnwb to
µ[β − α(1 + 2β)] > (1 + β)[α(1 + 2β + β2) − β]
Both inequalities are satisfied under α ⩽ β
1+2β+β2
. This means that
max{ψ;ψnwb} < ψp < min{ψb; 1} and the proposition follows.
Appendix D. Proof of Corollary 2
Using (36)–(38), the inequality b̃∗2 > n
∗̃b∗1 is equivalent to
ψ > ψn, with
ψn ≡
µ(1 − α)
1 + αβ + β2
Using now (43), ψp > ψn is equivalent to
β − α(1 + 2β + β2) + µ(1 − α) > 0
which is always satisfied for α ⩽ β
1+2β+β2
.
Using Proposition 3, we have γ ∗ > γwb. Using (17) and (36),
we easily deduce that n∗ < nwb. This means that MY ∗ > MYwb.
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